Greetings from Ngunnawal country in Canberra. I add my respects to the traditional custodians of our lands, seas and waterways. I must say that the latest statistics on ‘closing-the-gap’ are shameful. Our nation will not be complete unless and until we build this bridge.

So, will AUKUS make us safer? In a word: “NO” – and that is a real worry for our future security. In this short presentation I want to leave you with five key and inter-related takeaways to consider.  I will very briefly address each of these points in turn.

 
First, AUKUS jeopardises our security, both strategically and operationally

Strategically:

Our choice should not be between prosperity from China as our major trading partner or security from the US. Like other countries in our region we need to manage our international relationships, hedge our bets, ensure our independence, and invest in a coherent and achievable national security strategy.

Operationally:

AUKUS unbalances our Defence Force and further embeds us in future wars conducted by the US, whether we like it or not.Defence has previously contended that a minimum of 12 submarines are required to maintain an effective two ocean presence, but in best case AUKUS only provides eight.Expert submariners have advised that it will not be possible to crew and service three different classes of AUKUS submarines as is currently planned. AUKUS submarines can be Australian-flagged, commanded and crewed, but they will operate under the US command and control system. A retrograde step that returns us to the time when the RAN served as part of the Royal Navy.

Submarines may not be totally obsolete by the time Australia finally commissions HMAS AUKUS, but advances in technology – particularly in autonomous robotics and underwater detection – will almost certainly render them obsolescent.

China is NOT a threat to Australia or our vital interests

My second point relates to China.

There can be little doubt that AUKUS was predicated on the unsubstantiated assertion that China may threaten Australia and jeopardise the so-called rules-based international order. But there is little evidence to support this assertion.

China has certainly modernised and expanded its defence force. Short of mutual nuclear annihilation no adversary could now defeat China on its territory or in its immediate region. China’s security is assured.

With its increased military capability China has become more assertive in its immediate region, particularly in relation to Taiwan and its claims in the South China Sea. History suggests that we should expect this of great powers – it is normal. But China has not threatened other countries and, unlike the USA, it is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is committed to freedom of navigation, on which its trade, including with Australia, depends.   

China is already the major power in Asia, and if not so already it is destined to become the world’s leading economy well before the AUKUS timetable reaches maturity. China is not, and has never been, a hegemonic power. China does not have numerous military bases abroad and since the Korean War has not been involved in major and protracted conflicts.

Australia needs to strengthen relations with China on which our future prosperity depends. This does not mean subordinating our national interests, or again becoming too economically dependent on China, but respecting China as the great power it now is.

Rather than contesting and competing with China in the South Pacific we should welcome China’s economic assistance to help develop these countries in accordance with each country’s priorities – this is good development practice. We should seek China’s agreement for this region to remain a nuclear-free and non-militarised zone. 

We need urgently to recalibrate our alliance with the United States

My third point focuses on the need to urgently recalibrate our alliance with the US.

Personally, I am pro-American. But AUKUS, AUSMIN and the Force Posture Initiatives have transformed the original intention of the ANZUS Agreement. We have now gone well beyond an agreement to ‘consult’ on security matters.

In our quest to be protected by the US, and despite the lack of any major threat to our country, we have allowed ourselves to be colonised by Uncle Sam. Far from assuring our security, US military installations in Australia, and those to come under AUKUS, will be directly targeted, with the likelihood of significant civilian collateral damage. We have no defence against such attacks, and in the event of nuclear attack it is “all over, red rover”.  Yet, the details of these bases and their consequent risks to our security have not been shared with the Australian public.

Perhaps because of our ‘fear of abandonment’ we have too willingly committed military forces to failed wars with the US, based on inadequate strategic legitimacy and unachievable ends. We have been camp-followers to US military and political failures in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and to an illegal invasion of Iraq that resulted in regional mayhem. In Afghanistan the reputation of our elite Special Forces was unnecessarily tarnished. And the Royal Commission’s findings into deaths by suicide revealed the enormous tragedy to veterans and their families from engaging in these useless wars. And can anyone explain how Australian ships firing missiles into Houthi strongholds in Yemen adds to Australia’s security?

We urgently need to recalibrate our commitment to the US Alliance. Strategically, we can encourage the US not to go to war with China, and to share power sensibly. Our primary contribution to the alliance should continue to be maintenance of peace in the Southwest Pacific. And leading by example we can encourage the Americans to re-engage in UN peacekeeping, indeed as we should also do. 

Our Defence Strategy of ‘deterrence through denial’ is unachievable

My fourth point is that our defence strategy of ‘deterrence through denial’ is both dangerous and unachievable. We need to rethink it. There can be little doubt that our Defence Department has been captured by the Pentagon.

I recall the wise motto of the Royal Military College Duntroon, Doctrina vim Promovet, Learning promotes Strength. But I don’t think we have learnt very much at all, and we are certainly no stronger.

Nuclear deterrence has some relevance in its madness because of mutually assured destruction. But there is little historical evidence that conventional deterrence has ever worked. Too frequently it results in an arms race that leads to war. And when armed to the teeth opportunities need to be found to test the latest technology. The so-called ‘War on Terror’ in which Australia too willingly followed the US provides a recent example. 

The procurement of weapons systems can never deter an opponent, and so it is with AUKUS. As for ‘denial’, it is not at all clear what it is that our Defence Strategy is ‘denying’. In essence, ‘deterrence’ and ‘denial’ are nice words without practical meaning.

Our Defence Strategy must support, and not lead, a comprehensive national security strategy, which Australia does not currently have.  Our Defence Strategy must be achievable. We will require a strong, independent and balanced Australian Defence Force (ADF) focussed on a non-threatening posture of defence-in-depth, backed by demonstrable national resilience, a strong economy and detailed mobilisation planning.

For all these four reasons the APSF believes that our Government must review the AUKUS agreement and consider other and more cost-effective options.  A public review of AUKUS will provide Australians an opportunity to understand the choices we face and the costs and benefits of the various options.

Australia urgently needs a comprehensive Peace and Security Strategy

This leads me to my final and most important point.

The APSF has written to the Prime Minister and leaders of all major parties, and to most current Parliamentarians, requesting them to work collaboratively with the Australian people in the next term of government to prepare a comprehensive Australian Peace and Security Strategy (APSS).  

Given that our personal and collective security is, or should be, the most important responsibility for all our elected representatives, please consider this when you cast your vote at our next Federal election which is not far away.

This slide shows the types of issues that need to shape the APSS. Note that Defence is not national security, only an important component of it.

Many countries have a national security strategy, and they differ depending on geography, threats, national priorities and circumstances. All Five Eyes countries except Australia have a national security strategy.

At APSF we think it important to include the word ‘Peace’ in the title, because that reminds us of the endstate we seek.

Nor do we think that an APSS can be decided by a few parliamentarians and senior bureaucrats. It must reflect genuine consultation with the Australian people and be debated in parliament before approval by Cabinet committee.