Only the most naive still believe that America will come through on its side of the AUKUS deal. Luckily there is another way.

Dr Albert Palazzo

As the inherent risks of AUKUS become more apparent and as the United States sinks further into chaos there is a pressing need for Australia to recalibrate the foundation of its nation’s security.

The Australian government should accept that a changed security environment mandates a change in approach. Instead of the existing security policy of dependence on a great power protector, it is time for Australia to become a “strategic defensive” state — where the aim is not to defeat an aggressor, but merely stop them achieving their goals.

The strategic defensive is a military philosophy of long standing. It is ideally suited for Australia because — much like Switzerland — Australia’s geography, cultural attitude and security requirements combine to make it the natural choice for our national security. Modern military technologies and the fact that the defence is the naturally stronger aspect of war further underscore the utility of the strategic defensive for Australia. We have all the necessary attributes.

Strategic defensive states are not major powers and don’t harbour aggressive intent. We are largely satisfied with our place in the world and are able to meet nearly all our needs from our own resources. Australia’s most significant resource weakness is liquid fuels, a vulnerability easily rectified by the electrification of the economy.

The fact that Australia is an island continent compounds the difficulties for any aggressor while only making the adoption of the strategic defensive easier for us. Modern weapons — precision strike missiles and long-range drones — also tend to favour the defender.

For a strategic defensive state, the metric for military success is easier to achieve than it is for an offensively minded country. To meet our war goals Australia need only prevent the enemy from achieving its aims — our objective is not conquest but preservation. Further, Australia’s goal in war need not be to actively defeat the enemy but to wear it out so that its effort is abandoned. Being on the defence doesn’t mean Australia won’t attack back, it just means that Australia shouldn’t pursue the impossible aim of competing with the enemy as equals.

The only reason Australia is not already a strategic defensive state is because of its long-standing dependence on a great power protector. So deep is this dependency, and the need to play the part of a loyal ally, that the paramount design principle of the Australian Defence Force is to fight as a subset of the US military. This is the primary reason that Australia insisted on participating in US-led wars from Vietnam to Iraq. 

Unfortunately for Australia’s political leaders, the logic of dependence is no longer tenable, despite their naive hope that all is well. Only the most irrational optimist can still believe that the US will increase its submarine build rate to the point that it can fulfil its needs as well as the promises it has made to Australia, something a US admiral has openly admitted. Nor is the US the ally it once was, as its treatment of its friends demonstrates. Meanwhile Donald Trump cosies up to fellow autocrats such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin. The global ruled-based base order that the Australian government has invested so much in has ceased to exist, as a result of current US policies. Meanwhile climate change continues to worsen, and will only be made more dire by Trump’s anti-environment agenda. 

Luckily, abandoning dependency on the United States and adopting a defensive-focused force posture is not difficult. The requisite military technologies already exist. The main impediment is cultural. Australia’s political leaders have for so long — and so automatically — deferred to the requirements of the United States that to change course will be seen as too risky to contemplate. AUKUS is the latest intensification of this cultural rut.

Instead of waiting for the inevitable failure of AUKUS, it would be more sensible to transition to a security concept that is actually viable. Numerous commentators, such as Malcolm Turnbull and Peter Briggs, have called upon the government to develop a Plan B for the nation’s defence. Fortunately, such a plan already exists. My recently published book, The Big Fix: Rebuilding Australia’s National Security, examines what is wrong with AUKUS and outlines how the strategic defensive provides what Australia actually needs to be secure and independent. 

There is little doubt that between the worsening effects of climate change, China’s increasing power and the United States’ descent into authoritarianism the risk environment is changing. The future will be different from the past. The government has admitted this in numerous policy documents, even as Australia’s leaders insist on maintaining the existing policy of dependency.

Readers of John Maynard Keynes would recognise the folly of this as they reflect on his well-known saying, “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do sir?” For Australia to meet the challenges of a more uncertain and dangerous future, we need to do something different. We do need a Plan B.

First published on Crikey, 23 September 2025